Syrian S-300s: Evaluating the Threat

The International Community received a jolt last Thursday when erroneous reports circulated claiming that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, in an interview with al-Manar TV, assured that initial deliveries of Russian S-300 missile systems had already arrived in the country. The 2010 contract, valued at up to $1 billion, between Russia and the Assad government, has long been a point of contention in efforts to negotiate a political solution to the crisis in Syria. This piece will seek to further understand the S-300 as a weapons system and the consequences of its possible installation in Syria.

It is well known in the defense community that the Russian S-300 is one of the world’s most formidable antiaircraft systems. Originally designed to defend the Soviet Union from Western airborne threats, the weapon has undergone a series of upgrades since its inception in 1979. It is widely held that the Syrian government ordered its latest incarnation, the S-300PMU-2. In order to understand why NATO and Israel remain so apprehensive about Syrian S-300s, it is first necessary to examine the weapon’s capabilities.

The S-300 is a fully mobile system composed of four individually tasked vehicles. The ability to shift its location makes the S-300 far more versatile than a fixed battery, allowing commanders to expand antiaircraft coverage to strategic locations where and when necessary. Its long-range radar can detect and actively track up to one hundred targets at a range of 185 miles. The system’s surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are particularly potent in that they can engage targets at both extremely low and high altitudes (32 to 88,582 ft) at a range of 93 miles. The unit can launch twelve missiles at once, tasking two to each target. Engaging in pairs allows the S-300 to increase destructive capacity and chances of a hit; if one missile is thwarted by countermeasures such as flares or chaff, a second is ready to strike.

A major concern is the lethality of the S-300’s missiles. The following chart illustrates this in affirming the inability of modern warplanes to outrun a SAM fired by the vehicles on the ground. The U.S-made F-16 and F-15 Strike Eagle are staples of the Israeli Air Force, which has utilized both in the past to conduct airstrikes in Syrian territory. The F-22, the USAF’s fifth-generation fighter, and the B-2 long-range bomber are the only stealth platforms currently available in a theoretical western intervention. Even here however, the S-300 presents challenges. It is designed specifically to combat airframes featuring “small radar cross-sections.” How small, however, is not a matter of public knowledge.

While Israel lacks stealth aircraft, it has made up for this vulnerability in the past by employing highly sophisticated electronic warfare techniques with great success. In the 1982 Operation Mole Cricket, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) circumvented 17 out of 19 Syrian SA-6 antiaircraft batteries using both electronic and physical means while retaining no losses. This pattern was repeated in 2007 upon commencement of Operation Orchard, which was initiated to destroy Syria’s nuclear reactor. Syrian radar was engaged electronically to either shut it down completely or “spoof it” by rendering Israeli planes undetectable. This was reportedly accomplished through a method known as “network invasion.” A 2007 report featured in Aviation Week magazine on the raid titled “Israel Shows Electronic Prowess” alleges:

That ability of nonstealthy Israeli aircraft to penetrate without interference rests in part on technology, carried on board modified aircraft, that allowed specialists to hack into Syrias networked air defense system, said U.S. military and industry officials in the attacks aftermath. Network raiders can conduct their invasion from an aircraft into a network and then jump from network to network until they are into the targets communications loop.

Such operators likely serve within the IAF’s “Sky Crows Squadron,” a division specifically focused on electronic warfare capabilities that lives by the code: “They shall not hear us; they shall not see us.” The Sky Crows utilize intelligence to locate and detect antiaircraft systems, and then develop ways in which to disrupt or disable them. As it was previously feared that Iran would receive S-300 systems under an $800 million contract signed in 2007, a deal Russia cancelled under significant international pressure, it is likely that the Israelis have several plans on the shelf in order to disable the air defenses electronically. Disrupting an S-300 however, will not be nearly as straightforward as older SAM sites such as the SA-6’s featured in Operation Mole Cricket. The S-300PMU-2 was designed to operate effectively in “heavy combat and electronic countermeasures environment(s),” and incorporates “enhanced ECCM” (electronic counter-counter measures) in order to do so.

An S-300 missile of the kind being sent to Syria, pictured at a military training ground in Russia. Photograph: Vladimir Mashatin/AFP/Getty Images

The possible introduction of such a complex and advanced system into Syrian territory presents grave implications for U.S. and Israeli military planners. Chief among American concerns is the difficulty the S-300 would impose in implementing a no-fly zone in Syria, one of the White House’s available options on the table. Establishing such a zone requires disabling an enemy’s air defense network through bombing, electronic attack, or a combination of the two. S-300s on the ground will complicate a NATO coordinated bombing campaign and greatly increase its risk of losses. The Israelis, however, have much more at stake. Their heightened concern is reflected in their more aggressive stance toward the weapon, demonstrated perhaps most dramatically in Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s reported warning to Russian President Vladmir Putin that Israel would destroy the antiaircraft systems should they be delivered to Syria.

Israel has a vested interest in destroying the S-300s, as their introduction would significantly hamper its current strategy of interdicting arms transfers to Hezbollah and other militant groups. Defense analyst Yakoov Katz also notes that the S-300 would “impair Israel’s operational freedom and undermine its aerial superiority in a future conflict.” Of note in such impairment is the S-300’s long-range radar capabilities, which could detect Israeli planes long before they even reached the Syrian border, thereby alerting the Syrian government of an imminent attack and foiling the element of surprise. Furthermore, while the Israeli Air Force has regularly employed flying low to the ground to escape radar detection in the past, the S-300’s ability to shoot down targets at very low altitudes may render such an approach impossible. Finally, the existence of S-300s in Syria could challenge Israel’s ability to conduct air operations over Lebanon.

Yet even as Israel and the U.S. are fretting over the risks the delivery would pose, the status of the contract, the shipment date, and the operational timetable of the missiles remain ambiguous. Russian media, relying on sources placed within the defense industry, report that the contract requires delivery by the spring of 2014. However, Russian defense authorities have also implied that delivery could occur much sooner if the West chooses to intervene. It would appear that Moscow is taking advantage of the controversy surrounding the S-300 weapons system in order to gain additional leverage in advance of next month’s proposed peace conference in Geneva. Putin’s assertion, reported by Maariv, to Netanyahu that a prevention of the transfer was possible if the missiles were purchased “by another entity” or if Israel were to “offer an alternative” gives further weight to this “bargaining chip” theory. The notion of “offering an alternative” also reflects the exchange between Russia and Israel in 2010 regarding the potential sale of S-300s to Iran. Reuters reported that wikileaks cables revealed the use of S-300s as a diplomatic tool in the past, and notes that soon after the Russian cancellation of the contract, Israel “agreed to sell Russia surveillance drones that would narrow its technological military gap with Georgia.” Therefore, the cancelled Iran deal established an important precedent of exchange that could provide a solution in wake of the Geneva talks.

If, however, the Russians choose to go ahead with the deal, how prepared are NATO and Israeli forces to defeat the S-300? While the system has never engaged a target in combat, its previous generation-variant, the S-300PMU, has been featured in two NATO exercises: TRIAL HAMMER in 2005 and MACE XIII in 2012.  While the results of the system against targets including the F-16 were not made public, it is clear that the exercises allowed NATO to learn a great deal regarding the S-300’s capabilities, radar, and most importantly, how to exploit its vulnerabilities.

Once the S-300s are delivered, the Israelis, who have repeatedly threatened to destroy them once on the ground in Syria, will be forced to act quickly. If training the missiles’ operators occurs prior to delivery, as in the Iranian case, the S-300s could become operational within “minutes of delivery,” presuming the Syrian military proceeds efficiently. Tracking the shipment of the missile systems should be easy enough for Israeli and U.S. intelligence: its multi-piece composition provides a large target and should be observable through overhead reconnaissance while its radar emits a unique signal over long ranges. It would be in Israel’s best interest to strike before the missiles became operational, but even if they were unable to do so, some remain confident that their electronic means would thwart the S-300’s ECCM defenses. An anonymous source affiliated with Russia’s defense ministry quoted by Reuters acknowledged that Israel’s defense forces “likely have a million ways to combat the S-300 electronically.” More notably, Colonel Zyika Haimovich, a senior officer in the IAF, commented: “though it would impinge on our operations, we are capable of overcoming it.”

Although Russia may have successfully used the S-300 to its political advantage in 2010, doing so again in the Syrian crisis may backfire. If Russia bends to the will of Israel and the West, thereby cancelling the contract, it will significantly damage their reputation with future clients and will reduce its image as a powerful and independent authority. If, however, Russia decides to deliver the missiles and they are subsequently destroyed while operational, the reputation of the S-300 itself will be undermined and Russian arms will be showcased as inferior. Former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arenas perhaps summed it up best: “that would not make for good advertising.”